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Abstract—This paper investigates the achievable secrecy re-
gions when employing a friendly jammer in a cooperative
scenario employing an untrusted relay. The untrusted relay which
helps to forward the source signal towards the destination, could
also be regarded as a potential eavesdropper. Our system employs
a friendly jammer which sends a known noise signal towards
the relay. In this paper, we investigate the effect of jammer
and relay locations on the achievable secrecy rate. We consider
two scenarios where in the first case we consider no direct
transmission between the source and destination, while in the
second case we include a source to destination direct link in our
communication system.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the exponential growth of wireless devices, privacy of
the link becomes a major challenge. When many devices are
cooperating to help each other out especially in an unsecure
network, where relays may have poor security authorization,
privacy becomes a major challenge. To deal with this situation,
cooperative jamming is a promising technique, which uses
cooperating nodes to transmit artificial noise [1]. Most of
the algorithms discussed in the literature consider that the
relays are reliable and the eavesdropper is assumed to be an
outside entity which wants to tap the signal [1], [2]. However
in many situations like heterogenous networks, the relays
have a poor security authorization as compared to the source-
destination link. Therefore the relays could become a potential
eavesdropper and hence untrusted.
Untrusted relays were first studied by He and Yener in
[3], in which a source destination pair was assisted by the
relays. These authors discussed the prospects of whether using
an untrusted relay can be beneficial at all. They provided
the secrecy rates for an untrusted relay by using destination
as a jammer to keep their messages secret from the relay.
The authors in [4], presented a joint source and relay beam-
forming for untrusted relay MIMO systems. They proposed
two transmission strategies for transmitting confidential data
between source and destination, namely noncooperative and
cooperative secure beamforming. Noncooperative scheme con-
siders relay as an outside entity which does not take part in
communication, hence it is considered as an eavesdropper. The
relay is employed for relaying signals from the source to the
destination in a cooperative system and a joint source and
relay beamforming is designed for maximizing the secrecy.
The secrecy outage probability for different relaying protocols
were studied in [5] and the effect of number of relay nodes on
the secrecy capacity performance was investigated. In [6], the
author proposed a power allocation strategy for Amplify and
Forward (AF) based untrusted relay systems. They analyzed
the ergodic secrecy capacity (ESC) and presented compact
expressions for ESC in high Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR)
system.
Various algorithms on untrusted relay systems have been
stated, however most of the recent works considered single
relay model. For multiple relay models, [7] investigated that
as the number of untrusted relays increase, the secrecy capacity
decreases. A Destination-Based Jamming (DBJ) technique was
proposed in [7] for achieving positive secrecy rate. They pro-
vided an ESC lower bound closed form expression for a single
relay scenario, which was extended to multiple relay case.
They proposed a relay selection algorithm, which maximized
the achievable secrecy rate. In [8] another DBJ in an AF
based secure transmission in an untrusted relay scenario is
proposed. They provided an optimal power allocation strategy
and gave closed form expressions for three different scenarios
i.e. having large scale antenna array at the source, destination
and both source and destination, respectively. In [9] the authors
consider a multihop scenario with some untrusted relays.
Secrecy is examined by employing random linear network
coding at the relays. They analyzed the feasibility of em-
ploying untrusted relays with enough untrusted relays. The
authors in [10] suggested relay assignment and link adaptation
for both security and spectral-efficiency. High performance
rate adaptive channel coding schemes with efficient power
allocation is used to provide both reliability and security in the
presence of untrusted relays. Within this framework, several
schemes were proposed to achieve spectrally efficient link
adaptation and relay selection [10]. Their results indicated the
superiority of the proposed systems and it was found that
power adaptation at the source plays an important part in
improving spectral efficiency. Furthermore, [11] proposed a
security aware relaying scheme, where the transmissions of
both the first and the second phases in a two hop scenario are
secured.
In this contribution, we first consider a two hop system
where the direct link is not available between the source node
and the destination node, and then provide the results for
achievable secrecy rates at different positions of the jammer.
Then we include the source to destination direct link in our
system for our second scenario and present the results for
achievable secrecy rates.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section II
outlines the system model for our proposed scenario. Section
III furnishes the results for our proposed scenario, while the
conclusion is offered in Section IV.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider an AF based network consisting of a source
(S), a destination (D), an untrusted relay (R) and a cooperative
jammer (CJ) which assists in jamming the signal at the relay
by transmitting a noise signal that is known at the destination.
The two scenarios that we have incorporated in our paper are
described below.
A. Cooperative Jamming without S-D Direct Link
Here we consider a scenario where the direct link is not
available between the S and the D, as shown in Fig. 1. Each
node employs a single antenna and operates in a half-duplex
mode with hij being the rayleigh fading channel between node
i and node j. Total transmit power is reserved as P . Noise
at each receiver is characterised by a zero-mean, complex
Gaussian with variance N0. As seen in Fig. 1, S transmits
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Fig. 1: Cooperative Jamming System Model
the source signal xs with power αP and a single selected
CJ sends artificial noise ηCJ , with power (1− α)P which is
known to the D, where {0 ≤ α ≤ 1} is power distribution
variant. Therefore we can write the signal received at R as:
yr = hsr
√
αPxs + hCJr
√
(1− α)PηCJ + wr, (1)
where wr is the additive noise with variance N0 at R. After
this, R amplifies and forwards the received signal yr towards
D, where the signal received at D can be expressed as
yd = hrdηryr + wd, (2)
where wd is the Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) at
D and the amplification factor is given by
ηr =
√
P
αP |hsr|2 + (1− α)P |hCJr|2 +N0 . (3)
By substituting (1) and (3) into (2), we get
yd = hrdηr(hsr
√
αPxs+hCJr
√
(1− α)PηCJ +wr)+wd
= ηrhrdhsr
√
αPxs + ηrhrdhCJr
√
(1− α)PηCJ
+ ηrhrdwr + wd. (4)
Since ηCJ is known at D, the term ηrhrdhCJr
√
(1− α)PηCJ
can be removed from yd before decoding the source informa-
tion. The amplification factor in Eq. (3) can be inserted to the
received signal to obtain
yd =
√
α
αP |hsr|2 + (1− α)P |hCJr|2 +N0Phrdhsrxs+√
P
αP |hsr|2 + (1− α)P |hCJr|2 +N0hrdwr + wd. (5)
We can calculate the SNR γD at D as follows:
γD =
∣∣∣∣√ ααP |hsr|2+(1−α)P |hCJr|2+N0Phrdhsr
∣∣∣∣2∣∣∣√ PαP |hsr|2+(1−α)P |hCJr|2+N0hrd∣∣∣2N0 +N0
=
α P
2
N20
|hrd|2|hsr|2
P
N0
|hrd|2 + α PN0 |hsr|2 + (1− α) PN0 |hCJr|2 + 1
. (6)
Therefore,
γD =
αγrdγsr
γrd + αγrd + (1− α)γCJr + 1 (7)
Similarly, from Eq. (1) we can derive the SNR γr at R as
follows:
γr =
|√αPhsr|2
|√(1− αP )hCJr|2 + 1
=
αγsr
(1− α)γCJr + 1 . (8)
Consequently, the achievable rates R¯D at D and R¯r at R will
be calculated as
R¯D =
1
2
log(1 + γD)
=
1
2
log
(
1 +
αγrdγsr
γrd + αγrd + (1− α)γCJr + 1
)
(9)
R¯r =
1
2
log(1 + γr) =
1
2
log
(
1 +
αγsr
(1− α)γCJr + 1
)
(10)
Finally, the secrecy rate R¯s of the system is given by:
R¯s = R¯D − R¯r (11)
B. Cooperative Jamming with S-D Direct Link
The transmission of the message signal comprises of two
phases in this scenario, namely the broadcast phase (1st phase)
and the relaying phase (2nd phase), as shown in Fig. 2.
During the 1st phase, S transmits the source signal xs with
power αP and a single selected jammer CJ sends artificial
noise ηCJ , with power (1 − α)P which is known to the D,
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Fig. 2: Cooperative Jamming System Model
where {0 ≤ α ≤ 1} is the power distribution factor. Therefore
the signals received at R and D are, given by
yr = hsr
√
αPxs + hCJr
√
(1− α)PηCJ + wr, (12)
and
y
(1)
d = hsd
√
αPxs + hCJd
√
(1− α)PηCJ + w(1)d , (13)
where wr and w
(1)
d represent the AWGN at R and D during
the 1st phase, respectively. Then, R amplifies and forwards the
received signal yr during the 2nd phase, where the received
signal at D can be expressed as
y
(2)
d = hrdηryr + w
(2)
d , (14)
where w(2)d represents the AWGN at D during this phase and
the amplification factor may be written as
ηr =
√
P
αP |hsr|2 + (1− α)P |hCJr|2 +N0 . (15)
By substituting Eqs. (12) and (15) into Eq. (14), we get
y
(2)
d = hrdηr(hsr
√
αPxs + hCJr
√
(1− α)PηCJ + wr)
+ w
(2)
d
= ηrhrdhsr
√
αPxs + ηrhrdhCJr
√
(1− α)PηCJ
+ ηrhrdwr + w
(2)
d . (16)
By adding two received signals y(1)d and y
(2)
d , we get
yd = ay
(1)
d + by
(2)
d , (17)
where a and b are the amplification constants. By substituting
Eqs. (13) and (16) into Eq. (17) (assuming a = 1 and b = 1),
we have
yd = hsd
√
αPxs + hCJd
√
(1− α)PηCJ + w(1)d +
ηrhrdhsr
√
αPxs + ηrhrdhCJr
√
(1− α)PηCJ
+ ηrhrdwr + w
(2)
d . (18)
Since ηCJ is known by D, both ηrhrdhCJr
√
(1− α)PηCJ
and hCJd
√
(1− α)PηCJ terms can be removed from yd to
yield:
yd = hsd
√
αPxs
+
√
α
αP |hsr|2 + (1− α)P |hCJr|2 +N0Phrdhsrxs
+
√
P
αP |hsr|2 + (1− α)P |hCJr|2 +N0hrdwr + wd. (19)
where wd = w
(1)
d + w
(2)
d , we can calculate the SNR at D as:
γD =
α2γsdγsr + α(1− α)γCJrγsd + αγsd + αγrdγsr
γrd + αγrd + (1− α)γCJr + 1 ,
(21)
Similarly, from Eq. (12) we can derive the SNR at R as:
γr =
|√αPhsr|2
|√(1− αP )hCJr|2 + 1
=
αγsr
(1− α)γCJr + 1 , (22)
Consequently, the achievable rates at D and R is given as:
R¯D =
1
2
log(1 + γD)
=
1
2
log
(
1 +
α2γsdγsr + α(1− α)γCJrγsd + αγsd + αγrdγsr
γrd + αγsr + (1− α)γCJr + 1
)
(23)
and
R¯r =
1
2
log(1+γr) =
1
2
log
(
1 +
αγsr
(1− α)γCJr + 1
)
. (24)
The secrecy rate R¯s of the system can be calculated as
R¯s = R¯D − R¯r (25)
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
Figs. 3, 4 and 5 show the secrecy rates for the two cases
discussed with relay being employed close to the source, in
the center and close to the destination, respectively. The X
and Y axis give the location of the jammer on the plane and
for a specific jammer the secrecy rate is represented by the Z
axis on that specific location of the jammer. The X and Y axis
range from 0 - 4 km in distance. Note that the reduced distance
related to path gain [12] is given by: Gij =
(
dsd
dij
)α
, where
dij is the distance between node i and node j. Furthermore
we have hij =
√
Gij h¯ij . We consider a pathloss exponent
of γ = 4, while α is set to 0.8. Fig. 3 shows the secrecy
rate performance when the relay is closer to the source. We
can see that the secrecy rate improves if there is a direct link
between source and destination in addition to the relay link for
its transmission. In addition, at a closer look we can see that
the secrecy rate is maximum if the CJ is at a certain distance
from the relay which can be seen as a ring shaped region
in Fig. 3(a). If the CJ is closer to relay than this point, the
secrecy rate drops because the signal received at destination is
γD =
|hsd
√
αP |2 + |
√
α
αP |hsr|2+(1−α)P |hCJr|2+N0Phrdhsr|2
|
√
P
αP |hsr|2+(1−α)P |hCJr|2+N0hrd|2N0 +N20
=
αP |hsd|2(αP |hsr|2 + (1− α)P |hCJr|2 +N0) + αP 2|hrd|2|hsr|2
P |hrd|2N0 + αP |hsr|2N0 + (1− α)P |hCJr|2N0 +N0
=
α2 P
2
N20
|hsd|2|hsr|2 + α(1− α) P 2N20 |hsd|
2|hCJr|2 + PN0 |hsd|2 + α P
2
N20
|hrd|2|hsr|2
P
N0
|hrd|2 + α PN0 |hsr|2 + (1− α) PN0 |hCJr|2 + 1
(20)
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Fig. 3: Relay at (x,y)=(1,1), and Source power is 90% of the
total power
more distorted due to a higher interference at relay. The drop
in secrecy rate can be seen more prominently in Fig. 4(a),
where the relay is at the center between the source and the
destination nodes. As seen in Fig. 4(b), the S-D direct link
provides a higher secrecy rate compared to that without the
S-D link seen in Fig. 4(a). Another observation that we can
make from the Figs. 3, 4 and 5 is that the secrecy rate depends
on the location of the relay as well. If a relay is closer to the
source then we can see that peak secrecy rates of 0.0655 and
0.4097 can be achieved for the CJ without S-D scenario and
the CJ with S-D scenario respectively, as shown in Fig. 3.
Furthermore in Fig. 4 the peak secrecy rates are 0.4158 and
0.6040 for the CJ without S-D and the CJ with S-D scenario,
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Fig. 4: Relay at (x,y)=(2,2), and Source power is 90% of the
total power
respectively. Finally in Fig. 5, where the relay is located closer
to the destination, we observe that the peak secrecy rates of
0.5642 and 0.6483 can be attained for the CJ without S-D case
and the CJ with S-D case, respectively.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have investigated the secrecy regions
for friendly jamming in two-hop as well as the cooperative
scenarios employing an untrusted relay. Our results show that
the secrecy rate regions for different scenarios depends heavily
on the positions of both the relay (a potential eavesdropper)
and the cooperative jammer. We show that the secrecy rates
are higher if the jammer is positioned closer to the relay. Our
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Fig. 5: Relay at (x,y)=(3,3), and Source power is 90% of the
total power
results also indicate that if the relay is closer to the destination
then we can ensure a higher secrecy rate in comparison to the
case when the relay is closer to the source. Secondly, our
results confirm that the secrecy rates would improve when we
have a direct S-D link in our transmission.
REFERENCES
[1] X. Zhou, M. Tao, and R. Kennedy, “Cooperative jamming for secrecy in
decentralized wireless networks,” in Communications (ICC), 2012 IEEE
International Conference on, June 2012, pp. 2339–2344.
[2] A. Bletsas, A. Khisti, D. Reed, and A. Lippman, “A simple cooperative
diversity method based on network path selection,” Selected Areas in
Communications, IEEE Journal on, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 659–672, March
2006.
[3] X. He and A. Yener, “Cooperation with an untrusted relay: A secrecy
perspective,” Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 56, no. 8,
pp. 3807–3827, Aug 2010.
[4] C. Jeong, I.-M. Kim, and D. I. Kim, “Joint secure beamforming design
at the source and the relay for an amplify-and-forward mimo untrusted
relay system,” Signal Processing, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 60, no. 1,
pp. 310–325, Jan 2012.
[5] J. Huang, A. Mukherjee, and A. Swindlehurst, “Secure communication
via an untrusted non-regenerative relay in fading channels,” Signal
Processing, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 61, no. 10, pp. 2536–2550, May
2013.
[6] L. Wang, M. Elkashlan, J. Huang, N. Tran, and T. Duong, “Secure
transmission with optimal power allocation in untrusted relay networks,”
Wireless Communications Letters, IEEE, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 289–292, June
2014.
[7] L. Sun, T. Zhang, Y. Li, and H. Niu, “Performance study of two-hop
amplify-and-forward systems with untrustworthy relay nodes,” Vehicular
Technology, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 61, no. 8, pp. 3801–3807, Oct
2012.
[8] A. Kuhestani and A. Mohammadi, “Destination-based cooperative jam-
ming in untrusted amplify-and-forward relay networks: resource alloca-
tion and performance study,” IET Communications, vol. 10, no. 1, pp.
17–23, 2016.
[9] T. Y. Liu, S. C. Lin, and Y. W. P. Hong, “Multicasting with untrusted
relays: A noncoherent secure network coding approach,” in Information
Forensics and Security (WIFS), 2015 IEEE International Workshop on,
Nov 2015, pp. 1–6.
[10] H. Khodakarami and F. Lahouti, “Link adaptation with untrusted relay
assignment: Design and performance analysis,” Communications, IEEE
Transactions on, vol. 61, no. 12, pp. 4874–4883, December 2013.
[11] L. Sun, P. Ren, Q. Du, Y. Wang, and Z. Gao, “Security-aware relaying
scheme for cooperative networks with untrusted relay nodes,” Commu-
nications Letters, IEEE, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 463–466, March 2015.
[12] H. Ochiai, P. Mitran, and V. Tarokh, “Design and analysis of collab-
orative diversity protocols for wireless sensor networks,” in Vehicular
Technology Conference, 2004. VTC2004-Fall. 2004 IEEE 60th, vol. 7,
Sept 2004, pp. 4645–4649 Vol. 7.
